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UNDER THE RADAR 
Muslims Deported, Detained, and Denied on Unsubstantiated Terrorism Allegations 
The U.S. government’s aggressive use of the immigration system in its counterterrorism  
efforts discriminates against Muslims and violates international human rights law.  
Through the targeted use of a wide set of immigration and law enforcement policies and  
practices, the U.S. government has cast Muslim immigrants as dangerous threats to  
national security, leaving communities across the United States vulnerable to abuse and 
discriminatory profiling.  A number of particular immigration programs and practices have  
received critical attention for their discriminatory impact on Muslim communities.  This  
Briefing Paper—jointly published by the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at  
NYU School of Law and the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund— 
identifies five key under-documented patterns of government practices that appear to be  
targeting Muslim communities through the immigration system.  
Drawing on interviews with immigration and criminal defense attorneys, community-based  
groups, and on court documents and media accounts, this Briefing Paper includes a number  
of case studies that suggest that the U.S. government is deporting, detaining, and denying  
benefits to Muslim immigrants on the basis of innuendo, religious and cultural affiliations,  
political beliefs, employment  histories, and immigrants’ ties to their home countries.  
The Briefing Paper concludes that these practices violate fundamental human rights and  
calls on the U.S. government to stop the discriminatory targeting of Muslims and ensure  
greater transparency and accountability in the immigration system.  
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GLOSSARY 
 
AALDEF Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund 
  
Absconder Apprehension 
Initiative 
A program to arrest non-citizens from predominantly Muslim 
countries with outstanding deportation orders. 
 
ACLU American Civil Liberties Union 
 
BIA Board of Immigration Appeals, the Executive Branch appellate 
body that reviews decisions of Immigration Judges and some 
decisions of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.  
 
BIF Benevolence International Foundation, a Muslim charity 
 
CHRGJ Center for Human Rights and Global Justice 
 
CERD Committee The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination 
 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
 
DOJ Department of Justice 
 
EOIR Executive Office for Immigration Review, the Executive Branch 
office overseeing the work of the BIA and Immigration Judges. 
 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
 
FOIA Freedom of Information Act 
 
HLF Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, a Muslim 
charity 
 
IACHR Inter-American Commission on Human Rights  
 
ICCPR The United Nation’s International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which is overseen by the Human Rights 
Committee. 
 
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement, a DHS agency tasked 
with the enforcement of immigration law. 
 
ICERD The United Nation’s International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, which is 
overseen by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
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Discrimination. 
 
Immigration Judge Non-judicial, executive branch official who determines the fate 
of persons charged with removability from the United States, 
and who are not bound by the same due process rules as Article 
III judges under standard criminal law. 
 
INA Immigration and Nationality Act, the statute governing U.S. 
immigration law. 
 
NSEERS National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, which 
required noncitizen men between the ages of 16 to 45, mostly 
from Muslim-majority countries, to submit to fingerprinting, 
photographs, intensive questioning, and periodic registration 
with the government. 
 
Operation Frontline U.S. government program, which in 2004, targeted alleged 
immigration violators whom the government had identified as 
national security concerns, the vast majority of whom were from 
Muslim-majority countries. 
 
Third Agency Check procedure Wherein all immigration detainees who are nationals of “special 
interest countries” are continuously detained by ICE until they 
are cleared by other intelligence agencies. 
 
USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, a DHS agency 
tasked with processing immigration benefits and related issues. 
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UNDER THE RADAR: MUSLIMS DEPORTED, DETAINED, AND DENIED 
ON UNSUBSTANTIATED TERRORISM ALLEGATIONS 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Through the targeted use of a wide set of immigration and law enforcement policies and actions, 
the U.S. government has cast Muslims as dangerous threats to national security, leaving Muslim 
communities across the United States vulnerable to discrimination and discriminatory profiling.1  
This Briefing Paper by the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (CHRGJ) and the Asian 
American Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF) documents the U.S. government’s 
deployment of lower evidentiary standards and lack of due process guarantees in the immigration 
system against Muslims to further marginalize this targeted group in the name of national security 
and counterterrorism.   
 
A number of particular immigration programs and practices—such as the National Security 
Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS),2 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) name-check 
system in the naturalization process,3 and racial profiling at U.S. borders4 have received critical 
attention for their discriminatory impacts on Muslim communities.  This Briefing Paper draws on 
interviews with immigration and criminal defense attorneys and community-based groups, court 
documents, and media accounts to identify five key under-documented patterns of government 
practices that appear to be targeting Muslim communities through the immigration system:5  
 
1. The U.S. government’s use of unsubstantiated terrorism-related allegations without bringing official charges in 
cases involving ordinary immigration violations.  This practice has the effect of prejudicing the 
immigration judge or placing the Muslim immigrant in a precarious situation where he is 
unable to defend himself against the allegations.  As a result, he is often pressured to self-
deport. 
2. The U.S. government’s practice of subjecting Muslim immigrants to detention ostensibly for posing national 
security threats in cases involving minor violations that ordinarily do not warrant detention.  Detention and 
threat of immigration detention are also used to coerce Muslims to drop challenges to 
immigration charges or accept plea deals in criminal cases. 
3. The U.S. government’s use of flimsy immigration charges.  For example, the government often uses 
false statement charges for failure to disclose tenuous ties to Muslim charitable organizations 
in such a way that seems to target Muslim immigrants for religious and political activities and 
affiliations. 
4. The U.S. government’s unfair application of overbroad statutory language of the terrorism bar provisions of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to remove, bar, and detain Muslims. 
5. The undue influence of the FBI on U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) activities.  The FBI is known to exploit the vulnerability of 
Muslim non-citizens as a way to facilitate its preventative counterterrorism policing 
objectives in prejudicial ways.   
 
Although we welcome the Department of Homeland Security’s April 27, 2011, announcement 
of the indefinite suspension of the NSEERS program,6 our documentation suggests the government 
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continues to use subtler—though no less abusive—practices of detention, deportation, and denial of 
immigration benefits. 
 
The overall effect of these practices is that religious, cultural, and political affiliations and lawful 
activities of Muslims are being construed as dangerous terrorism-related factors to justify detention, 
deportation, and denial of immigration benefits.  The government seems to be targeting Muslim 
immigrants not for any particular acts, but on the basis of unsubstantiated innuendo drawing largely 
on their religious and ethnic identities, political views, employment histories, and ties to their home 
countries.  Tareq Abu Fayad,7 for example, has been in immigration detention for more than four 
years because, according to the government, he is a likely target for terrorist recruiters.  The factors 
the government has relied on in making this claim do not point to any criminal wrongdoing and 
include his education, green card, clean criminal record, and the fact that the imam at his local 
mosque in Gaza later joined the Hamas government.  The FBI also seems to be exploiting 
vulnerabilities associated with the immigration system to target Muslims in various ways.  For 
example, the FBI visited Zuhair Mahd8 on multiple occasions, encouraging him to become an 
informant while his naturalization application was pending.  Mahd refused and his naturalization 
application was later denied.  USCIS later reversed its decision after Mahd filed a pro se lawsuit, and 
Mahd was sworn in as a citizen in 2009. 
 
These practices are also marked by a profound lack of transparency.  Many times, Muslim 
immigrants do not even know the basis of the allegations against them, because the government 
does not share them.  In the opaque “Third Agency Check” program, for example, thousands have 
been detained by immigration authorities for weeks and even months after an Immigration Judge 
has ordered them removed or released from detention on the basis that they are nationals of “special 
interest countries.”9  While the government has not publicly released a list of “special interest 
countries” for the Third Agency Check procedure, media reports suggest they are almost all Muslim-
majority countries.10 
 
When overbroad counterterrorism policies manifest in the immigration context—where there is 
an absolute void of checks and balances and a fundamental lack of transparency—there is all the 
more potential for government abuse.  We are concerned that the practices outlined in this Briefing 
Paper are guided by racial and religious stereotypes, in a way that constitutes discrimination in 
violation of U.S. obligations under international human rights law.  The practices identified in this 
Briefing Paper also suggest the United States is failing to uphold its international human rights 
obligations to guarantee the rights to due process; liberty and security of person; freedom of religion; 
freedom of expression and opinion; and the right to privacy and family. 
 
The government must stop targeting and punishing individuals for what it predicts they will do, 
especially when these predictions are not based on fact, but instead on religious and racial 
stereotypes and flimsy “evidence.”  CHRGJ and AALDEF call on the government to put an 
immediate stop to the discriminatory targeting of Muslims through the immigration system as 
outlined in this Briefing Paper, to provide greater transparency and accountability for immigration 
policies and enforcement.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has relied heavily on immigration law and 
policy to prosecute the so-called ‘War on Terror.’11  With fewer checks and balances, it is much 
easier for the government to arrest, detain, and investigate an individual under immigration law than 
criminal law.  In the American criminal legal system, a defendant has various rights and procedural 
protections: the right to an attorney; the right to a speedy trial in front of a jury of your peers; and 
the necessity to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.12  By contrast, in immigration court, a non-
citizen is permitted to have an attorney, but counsel is not provided for indigent persons and more 
than 80 percent of individuals in removal proceedings are pro se.13  Furthermore, in immigration 
court, an immigration judge—an executive branch official and not an independent Article III 
judge14—is both judge and jury, and a non-citizen can be mandatorily detained for months, or even 
years, before being released or removed from the United States.15  Finally, in immigration court, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) only has to prove an individual is removable by “clear 
and convincing evidence.”16   
 
These lesser substantive and procedural protections have allowed federal officials to undertake 
several initiatives that have targeted immigrants, primarily those from Muslim-majority countries, in 
the name of national security.17  Under the guise of executing the nation’s immigration laws, Muslim 
non-citizens have been subjected to large-scale, secret, and often lengthy preventive detention; 
exclusion based solely on their political views; guilt by association; unilateral detention by the 
executive branch; and nation-wide national security policies that have amounted to little more than 
wide-scale racial profiling,18 such as the Absconder Apprehension Initiative,19 the NSEERS special 
registration policy,20 and Operation Frontline.21  Over the past few years, both CHRGJ and 
AALDEF have been involved in documenting and challenging many of these policies.22     
 
II.  DISCRIMINATORY PATTERNS OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT   
 
This Briefing Paper identifies cases suggestive of five patterns of immigration enforcement 
practices against Muslim non-citizens.23 These cases and patterns were drawn from numerous 
interviews with immigration and criminal defense lawyers from across the country, as well as leaders 
of community-based organizations predominantly servicing Muslim communities.  CHRGJ and 
AALDEF also relied on court documents and news stories to verify the details of particular cases.  
Taken in context with prior well-known, nation-wide policies like NSEERS,24 the Absconder 
Apprehension Initiative, and Operation Frontline, the cases suggest that the government is targeting 
this group for detention, deportation, and denials of temporary visas, green cards, and naturalization.    
   
The lack of transparency and vulnerability involved in immigration proceedings and decisions 
makes it difficult to fully document these cases.  Decisions by immigration courts and USCIS are 
rarely published, while the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) only publishes precedential 
opinions.  Moreover, many immigrants fear discussing their cases publicly due to their vulnerable 
immigration status in the United States, especially when confronting unsubstantiated terrorism-
related allegations.  Others have been deported from the United States and are either unable to be 
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reached or fear talking because of the political situation in their own home countries.  Where the 
case studies in this Briefing Paper are anonymous, we have not cited to the materials relied upon out 
of the need to protect the individual’s identity.   
 
Many of the cases described in detail below exhibit more than one of the patterns, 
demonstrating the aggressive nature of the government’s actions towards Muslims.  Greater 
transparency and accountability within the immigration system is needed to allow for a fuller 
understanding of the nature and extent of these practices, to enable reform, and to provide remedies 
for those affected.25 
 
 
A.   LURKING TERRORISM ALLEGATIONS   
 
 The charges brought against Muslim immigrants are almost always ordinary immigration 
violations.26  Unlike ordinary immigration proceedings, however, the government often insinuates 
the immigrant’s involvement in some sort of terrorist activity, without providing either the basis or 
the evidence for its allegations.27  The low evidentiary standards of the immigration system permit 
the government to make these accusations without proof, which they would not be able to do in a 
criminal trial.28  The Washington Post has described the terrorism aspects of these immigration cases as 
“barely visible in the court files of those charged.”29   
 
 Once the government makes these often-unsubstantiated allegations, the immigrant is placed in 
the impossible position of having to defend himself without knowing the allegations levied against 
him.  “The difficulty of these cases, and I see them continually, is that the government will throw 
out [terrorism-related] allegations and never substantiate them, and you’re in a position where you 
have to respond,” states Sin Yen Ling, a lawyer with the Asian Law Caucus who has handled 
numerous immigration cases involving Muslim non-citizens.30  In some cases, the specter of 
‘possible terrorist activity’ appears to have prejudiced the immigration judge; in others, the 
government uses the potential charges to pressure the immigrant himself into dropping immigration 
challenges and leaving the country.    
Case Study:  Foad Farahi31 
Foad Farahi, an Iranian imam living in Florida, entered the U.S. on a student visa in 1994.  Starting 
in 2004, the FBI approached him multiple times to become an informant.  He consistently refused.  
In 2007, he appeared at a local immigration court for what he thought would be a routine hearing on 
his political asylum application.  Instead, ICE agents met him at the court, claiming that they had a 
file with evidence demonstrating he supported a terrorist group.  He could have either dropped the 
asylum case and left the U.S. voluntarily, or been detained and charged as a terrorist.   
 
Farahi chose voluntary departure, a form of immigration relief permitting an individual to leave 
the United States on his own recognizance.  Deportation would have meant being sent to Iran, 
where he feared religious persecution.  However, he later realized that the government’s claim was a 
bluff.  Despite repeated requests, the government refused to share with Farahi or his attorney any 
information about the alleged terrorism evidence, and he was never charged with any crime.  Farahi 
challenged the voluntary departure order, but the immigration judge ruled against him and the BIA 
dismissed his appeal.  However, in 2010, after three years of fighting, Farahi’s lawyer was able to 
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undo the voluntary departure order.  The government agreed to re-open his asylum case, which is 
now pending. 
 
Case Study: Abdelrehim Kewan32 
 
Abdelrehim Kewan, an Egyptian national, had a pending green card application based on his 
status as a battered spouse.  In 2002, while working as a housepainter, he lost his way driving to a 
paint job approximately 40 miles from his home in Southern California and ended up at the gates of 
a Marine base.  After his car was searched, he was allowed to leave.  Two weeks later, ICE officials 
arrested and detained him.  Despite the testimony of both FBI and Naval Criminal Investigative 
Services officials that Kewan was nothing more than a lost motorist, the immigration judge 
characterized him as a danger to the community and refused to grant him bond.  “Painters don’t get 
lost,” stated the immigration judge.33 
 
The immigration judge subsequently denied Kewan’s green card application, Despite official 
recognition by DHS officials on two previous occasions that he had been subject to mental and 
physical abuse by his former wife, the judge stated she doubted Kewan’s abuse.  He was detained for 
a total of 16 months before being deported. 
Case Study:  Sabri Samirah34 
 
Sabri Samirah, a Jordanian citizen, came to the United States in 1987 on a student visa.  He twice 
applied to change his immigration status to become a lawful permanent resident and was denied 
both times.  In the course of the second rejection, based on a visa technicality, the government 
referenced news reports stating that Samirah was affiliated with groups endorsing Hamas.  In 2002, 
USCIS granted Samirah permission (called ‘advance parole’) to visit his ill mother in Jordan.  When 
he attempted to reenter the United States, however, DHS revoked his parole and denied him 
reentry, claiming he was a security risk.  The government refused to reveal the evidence behind its 
determination.  When pressed at oral argument to disclose the grounds for the denial, the 
government’s lawyer made only a “cryptic statement… redolent of guilt by association, that maybe 
[Samirah] ‘needs better friends.’”35  The Seventh Circuit overturned the DHS decision, stating that 
the government had offered no evidence that Samirah was connected to Hamas, and remanding the 
case to the district court to order the Attorney General to allow Samirah back into the country so 
that he may apply to obtain legal status. 
 
As described in the case studies above, the government takes advantage of the lower protections 
offered to non-citizens during immigration proceedings to make coercive or prejudicial accusations 
against Muslim immigrants.  Without any genuine opportunity to rebut the claims, Muslims must 
consequently attempt to make their immigration cases in a more hostile environment.   
B.   ABUSIVE USE OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION   
 
 The U.S. immigration system permits detention of non-citizens in the process of removal 
proceedings.  Although all non-citizens are potentially subject to detention, most of those charged 
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with ordinary immigration violations and detained by ICE are provided a bond hearing and released 
after demonstrating that they are not a danger, threat to national security, or flight risk.36  However, 
lawyers report a recurring phenomenon in which Muslim non-citizens charged with minor 
immigration violations are detained in situations in which it is otherwise customary to release 
individuals.  Other Muslim immigrants have reportedly been subjected to mandatory detention 
under a vague terrorism bar provision of the INA.37  Finally, thousands continue to be detained by 
immigration authorities for weeks—and even months—after an Immigration Judge has ordered 
them removed or released from detention based on a government procedure called a “Third Agency 
Check.”38  Under the Third Agency Check process, all immigration detainees who are nationals of 
“special interest countries” are continuously detained by ICE until they are cleared by other 
intelligence agencies.  While the government has not publicly released a list of “special interest 
countries” for the Third Agency Check procedure, media reports in other contexts suggest they are 
almost all Muslim-majority countries.39 
 
Case Study:  Imam A.A.40 
“Imam A.A.,” a permanent resident of the United States since 1997, applied for naturalization 
after receiving his green card based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen.  An ICE agent sat in on his 
naturalization interview and, shortly thereafter, immigration officials arrested him.  Government 
lawyers alleged that because Imam A.A.’s divorce from a previous marriage was not finalized when 
he entered the marriage upon which his green card was based, the green card was invalid.  ICE 
placed him in detention to await the commencement of removal proceedings.  An immigration judge 
eventually ordered him released, stating in the written order that “[i]t appears the only reason he is 
being detained is because he is Muslim.”   
 
After his release, the government continued to fight the case for years, despite the testimony of a 
Swedish law expert on the legitimacy of the divorce proceedings.  Imam A.A. finally won five years 
after his initial arrest.  Even then, however, USCIS refused to re-open his naturalization case. 
 
Case Study:  F.Q.41 
“F.Q.,” originally from Pakistan, was arrested in 2009 for illegal entry into the U.S. after the 
company he worked for ran a security check on its employees.  Although he was not charged with 
any terrorism-related immigration violation or crime, the government subjected him to mandatory 
detention under INA § 236(c)(1)(D), the provision of the immigration code relating to detention for 
terrorism suspects.  The government put forward no evidence to support its allegations of terrorism, 
other than a 1999 asylum application, which stated that in 1996 he briefly volunteered for Jamiat-e-
Islami, a Pakistani political party.  The group, one of the largest political parties in Pakistan, has 
never been designated a terrorist group by the U.S.  Because he was subject to mandatory detention, 
F.Q. was not even provided a bond hearing to demonstrate that he was neither a flight risk, nor a 
security threat.  Despite the fact that he had a wife and children who were all U.S. citizens, as well as 
strong ties to his local community, he was mandatorily detained for months before being deported 
to Pakistan, where he currently resides.  
 
Case Study:  G.M.42 
“G.M.,” who had studied and worked in the United States for more than a decade, was arrested 
in a humiliating fashion in front of his neighbors by immigration officials in 2004.  At all times 
legally present in the United States, he was never charged with a terrorism-related immigration 
charge or any crime.  While detained, ICE agents interrogated him about his knowledge of extremist 
groups and other national security-related issues.  He was subsequently coerced into accepting 
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voluntary departure, a form of immigration relief where individuals are usually given a few weeks to 
pack their belongings and voluntarily leave the United States.  An ICE official told him he’d be 
released within a week, but instead he was detained for nearly two months in prison, where he was 
denied his medication for a gastrointestinal disease, as well as his right to fast during the Muslim 
holy month of Ramadan.  His prolonged detention was likely due to a “Third Agency Check,” a 
government policy where an immigration detainee is not released by ICE until cleared by other 
intelligence agencies.  An immigration detainee is subjected to a “Third Agency Check” not based 
on any actual intelligence, but rather solely based on the immigrant’s nationality.  After his lengthy 
detention, G.M. was deported to his home country.   
 
 The government also uses the threat of immigration detention to coerce Muslims into 
dropping challenges to immigration—and criminal—decisions.  This practice was used in the case of 
Foad Farahi, described above, as well the recent case of Mohamad Masfaka. 
 
Case Study:  Mohamad Masfaka43 
Mohamad Masfaka, a legal permanent resident originally from Syria, was periodically hired as a 
musician for the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) from 1998-99.  At the 
time, HLF was the largest Muslim charity in the U.S., providing humanitarian assistance to children 
and families in Muslim majority countries around the world.  In 2001—two years after Masfaka’s 
work with them—HLF was designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under questionable 
circumstances by the U.S. government.  The government claimed that HLF’s provision of 
humanitarian aid to Gaza freed up resources that Hamas used to fund terrorist activities.44  
 
 In 2002, Masfaka applied for naturalization, stating on his forms that he had been associated 
with HLF.  His application was never approved.  In 2008, he was criminally charged with making 
false statements, taking a false oath in a matter relating to naturalization, and attempting unlawful 
procurement of naturalization.  The government claimed that he had actually been employed by HLF, 
rather than associated with it, and then charged that his failure to disclose his employment was an 
attempt to cover up ties to a terrorist organization.   
 
Government officials simultaneously commenced removal proceedings against Masfaka, which 
threatened to subject him to mandatory immigration detention if he did not agree to a plea deal 
requiring self-deportation.  Although Masfaka’s lawyers felt there was a good chance he could have 
won the criminal case, the threat of removal proceedings and mandatory detention made pursuing 
his criminal case moot.  Masfaka’s choices were to either lose the criminal trial, be jailed, and then 
face the prospect of deportation, or win the trial and subsequently be placed in immigration 
detention for a lengthy period, while facing removal proceedings under the lower evidentiary 
standards of the immigration system. 
 
 Faced with this Catch-22, Masfaka accepted a plea agreement that resulted in a sentence of 
time-served but required him to self-deport to a country of his choosing.  He cannot return to Syria 
for fear of persecution, however, and the stigma of the implied terrorism-related charges against him 
will likely have an adverse effect on his prospects of obtaining asylum in a third country.  The 
government’s actions have effectively rendered him a stateless person. 
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These case studies represent only a handful of the cases we have encountered in which it 
appeared that immigration detention and immigration detention procedures are being used either 
selectively or coercively against Muslim non-citizens.  Immigration detention has long been a tool 
the government has used against Muslim communities.45  Despite the backlash in response to the 
post-September 11, 2001 mass detentions, our documentation suggests that the government 
continues to resort to subtler, but nonetheless abusive, detention practices. 
C.  FLIMSY IMMIGRATION CHARGES   
 
 Immigration lawyers have reported that the charges levied against Muslims non-citizens—
whether ordinary immigration charges or terrorism-related charges—rely on extreme interpretations 
of statutory language.  In other cases, charges have construed innocent behavior as criminal.  These 
practices suggest that the government is actively trying to deport and deny entrance, green cards, or 
citizenship to Muslim individuals.46  “The approach is basically to target the Muslim and Arab 
community with a kind of zero-tolerance immigration policy,” says David Cole, a law professor at 
Georgetown University.47  According to Cole, “No other community in the U.S. is treated to zero-
tolerance enforcement.”48   
 
The use of flimsy immigration charges can be broken down into two main groups:  
1.  False statement charges based on an alleged association with a Muslim charity 
or group   
 
Muslim non-citizens have been deported or denied naturalization, green cards, and visas for 
minor misrepresentations related to past, often tenuous, affiliations with Muslim organizations.49 
Government officials allege these individuals have committed immigration fraud, or have failed to 
demonstrate “good moral character” for providing false testimony with the purpose of gaining an 
immigration benefit.50  In many cases, government officials interview individuals multiple times, 
asking the same questions over and over.  According to Jennie Pasquarella, Staff Attorney with the 
ACLU-Southern California, the nature of the repeated interviews suggest the officials are attempting 
to trip individuals into making minor mistakes or inconsistencies which can subsequently be 
construed as false statements.51  This practice is in tension with the USCIS Adjudicator’s Field 
Manual, which requires that immigration officials provide applicants with an opportunity to explain 
seemingly false statements.52  
 
Serious questions have been raised about the process by which the U.S. government has 
designated a number of major Muslim charities as terrorist entities, including the Holy Land 
Foundation and Benevolence International Foundation (BIF).53  The ACLU has noted that:  
 
“The Treasury Department has virtually unchecked power to designate groups as terrorist 
organizations. . . .   The government’s actions against [HLF, BIF, and Global Relief Foundation] 
were the start of a pattern of conduct that violated the fundamental rights of American Muslim 
charities and has chilled American Muslims’ charitable giving in accordance with their faith, seriously 
undermining American values of due process and commitment to First Amendment freedoms.”54   
 
Similar concerns have been raised about the designation of individuals on such lists.55 
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Case Study:  Tarek Hamdi56 
Tarek Hamdi, an Egyptian national, has been a U.S. resident since 1988.  After passing his 
naturalization exam in 2002, USCIS scheduled Hamdi for an oath ceremony.  He then heard nothing 
from USCIS for four years.  In 2006, he received a letter from USCIS scheduling him for a second 
interview.  Because he was abroad at the time, he did not receive the letter until the interview date 
had passed.  USCIS subsequently denied his application and Hamdi applied to naturalize a second 
time in 2007.  USCIS denied his application on ‘good moral character’ grounds.  It alleged that he 
failed to reveal his affiliation with the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), a humanitarian 
aid organization designated under questionable circumstances as a financier of terrorism in 2002.57  
USCIS denied his application on the grounds that he made false statements during his interview.  
 
Regarding his situation, Hamdi stated: 
 
“I always played by the rules. I paid taxes, contributed to society and raised a beautiful family.  I         
have been treated differently because I am a Muslim man.  This has been incredibly frustrating and 
truly demoralizing.  No person of faith, no honest man should have to face the discrimination I 
have, especially when striving to take an oath of allegiance to the United States.”58 
 
In 2000, prior to BIF’s designation, Hamdi attended a BIF fundraiser and wrote a check for 
$8,000 to the group.  He stated that the check was a compilation of donations from friends who 
could not attend the event.  In 2009, Hamdi appealed USCIS’s denial.  He acknowledged that he 
made donations to BIF, but stated that he did not understand that his donations to BIF constituted 
an “association” with that organization.59  His appeal was denied in April 2010, again on false 
statement grounds regarding his association with the BIF.  The ACLU of Southern California is 
currently representing Hamdi in an appeal of USCIS’s decision to the District Court for the Central 
District of California.   
Case Study: “B.B.”60 
“B.B.,” a 70-year-old Iranian citizen, was granted political asylum in 1990.  He filed his 
naturalization application in 2005.  In 2010,61 USCIS denied the application on the grounds that B.B. 
provided false testimony during his naturalization interview.  Specifically, it claimed that he lied 
about his membership in Mujahedin E-Khalq (MEK), an Iranian organization designated by the U.S. 
as a terrorist organization.62  USCIS’s evidence of membership was based solely on an FBI interview 
with B.B. in 1999, in which USCIS alleges he “admitted he was a member of the MEK” and 
“admitted to attending meetings of the MEK in Los Angeles.”63  B.B. denies that he was a member 
of MEK or that he ever admitted to such.  
 
B.B. missed the deadline to file an appeal.  The ACLU has written a letter to USCIS on B.B.’s 
behalf requesting an opportunity to appeal the decision despite the missed deadline.  B.B. is awaiting 
a response.   
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2. Unsubstantiated or irrational charges   
 
Many cases we investigated involved government conduct that seemed to lack legitimate basis.  
 
Case Study:  Zoubir Bouchikhi64 
Zoubir Bouchikhi, an Algerian-born imam, applied for permanent residency in 2003.  His 
application was denied in 2007 because his employer, the Islamic Society of Greater Houston 
(ISGH), “failed to prove Bouchikhi had been continuously employed for the two years prior to 
filling out his petition and had not demonstrated its ability to pay Bouchikhi’s salary…. [and] had not 
proved Bouchikhi was an imam by submitting a formal certificate of ordination.”  According to 
Bouchikhi, all documents requested by USCIS to prove these details were made available within 
weeks of the initial denial and before the subsequent appeal.  USCIS then altered its reason for the 
denial, stating that he was inadmissible in 2006 when he returned from travel abroad—even though 
that travel had been authorized by USCIS. 
 
In 2008, ICE arrested and detained Bouchikhi.  Although bond was initially granted for $20,000, 
Bouchikhi was later detained for five months before finally being released.  Then, weeks before his 
scheduled date of deportation in January 2011, he was again picked up and detained by ICE agents.  
ICE claimed it had evidence that he would not leave the country on his scheduled deportation date, 
but refused to state what that evidence was.  Bouchikhi’s appeal is currently pending before the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.65 
Case Study:  “Imam C.C.”66 
 “Imam C.C.,” admitted to the United States on a special immigrant visa as an imam in 1997, 
applied for naturalization in 2002.  USCIS granted his naturalization application, but twice sent the 
notice of the oath ceremony to the wrong address.  Because he never received this information, 
Imam C.C. did not attend the ceremony.  In 2006, after repeated inquiries into the status of his 
naturalization, his attorney filed a mandamus action to compel the agency to reschedule his oath 
ceremony.  USCIS then reopened the case on its own motion, based on the ‘derogatory’ information 
that he had failed to appear at his oath ceremony.  His naturalization application was subsequently 
denied because of three traffic violations he had incurred over a period of 11 years, a rationale 
labeled as “unheard of” by his attorney. 
 
       According to the Washington Post, Muslim activists report that the government is “scouring the 
immigration papers of Arabs and Muslims it considers suspicious.”67  The cases above demonstrate 
how it then strains facts and legal interpretations beyond any reasonable understanding in order to 
find them deportable or ineligible for naturalization, green cards, and temporary visas.68  
D.  THE TERRORISM BARS PROVISIONS   
 
Akin to the material support ban in the federal criminal code,69 the ‘terrorism bars’ provisions of 
the immigration code, INA § 212(a)(3)(B) and § 237 (a)(4)(B), provide for the removal or denial of 
admission of non-citizens suspected of terrorist activity or of providing support to terrorist activity.  
The problems created by the breadth and vagueness of the terrorism bars have been well-
documented in the asylum context: refugees have been caught under material support provisions for 
having been kidnapping victims who became child soldiers and for such acts as providing help or 
money under duress, often turning the facts of their claims for asylum against them.70  Extreme 
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applications of the provisions have been used to deport or deny admission to Muslim non-citizens 
outside of the asylum context as well.71 
 
The terrorism bars cases suggest targeting of Muslims on the basis of expression of political and 
religious views and beliefs, violating not only international law guaranteeing freedom of expression, 
but also First Amendment protections.   
Case Study:  Michel Shehadeh and Khader Hamide (LA8)72 
One of the most prominent terrorism bars cases involved two men, Michel Shehadeh and 
Khader Hamide, who were a part of the famed Los Angeles 8 or LA8.  The LA8 are activists for the 
liberation of Palestine whom the government had tried to deport since 1987 under a McCarthy-era 
law that made affiliations with communist groups a deportable offense.73  In going after the LA8, the 
government openly admitted the political motivations behind the charges: “William Webster, the 
director of the FBI at the time of the arrests, testified in Congress that the eight had not engaged in 
criminal activity and could not have been legally arrested if they had been U.S. citizens.”74  The law 
under which the LA8 were originally charged was declared unconstitutional by the Ninth Circuit in 
1989 and repealed by Congress in 1990.75  Then, in 2005, the government attempted to retroactively 
apply the terrorism bars to remove Shehadeh and Hamide.  In 2007, the immigration judge threw 
out the case, characterizing the 20-year effort to deport the men as “an embarrassment to the rule of 
law.”76 
 
In some cases, the government has used the terrorism bars provisions in attempts to deport 
individuals for the very same acts they had already been acquitted of in criminal cases.   
Case Study:  Youssef Megahed77 
 
Youssef Megahed, a legal U.S. resident of Egyptian origin, was a 21-year-old student at the 
University of South Florida when he was arrested with his friend Ahmed Mohamed in August 2007.  
A police officer stopped Mohamed’s car for speeding and found material for model rockets in the 
trunk, which the government later characterized as explosives for terrorist activity.  Both Mohamed 
and Megahed were indicted for carrying explosives across state lines.78  While co-defendant 
Mohamed took a plea deal, Megahed opted to go to trial.  The jury accepted Megahed’s defense that 
he was unaware of the materials in Mohamed’s trunk and acquitted Megahed of criminal charges for 
possessing and transporting explosives.   
 
Three days after his acquittal, ICE arrested Megahed and brought deportation proceedings 
against him for the very same facts in his criminal case, alleging that Megahed was “engaged or likely 
to become engaged in… terrorist activity.”  Evidence presented by ICE included materials found on 
the family computer at Megahed’s home, which ICE alleged contained, “numerous videos, 
documents and an Internet search history that supports Islamic extremism, jihad against the United 
States.”79  Megahed was held in Glades County Detention Center for almost four months until an 
immigration judge dismissed his deportation case in late August 2009, finding that the government 
had not presented enough evidence to conclude that Megahed was likely to engage in terrorism.80  
Megahed was mandated, however, to report monthly to ICE in Tampa.  By the time the case was 
dismissed Megahed had been under house arrest or detention for almost two years.81 Megahed felt 
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the immigration case brought against him constituted “double jeopardy because the same allegations 
[in the immigration case were] the same allegations that was there, in the court, in the trial.”82 
 
   
In other cases, the terrorism bars provisions have been used to deny non-citizens entrance into 
the United States.  The case of Tareq Abu Fayad shows the extremely broad reach of terrorism bars 
laws and the government’s willingness to use the law against Muslims.  Section 212(a)(3)(B) was 
interpreted to allow the detention of a young Palestinian student for more than four years as 
someone ‘likely to engage in terrorism,’ despite the lack of any actions, hard evidence or criminal 
activity whatsoever—which the government conceded. 
Case Study:  Tareq Abu Fayad83 
 
Tareq Abu Fayad, a Saudi-born Palestinian national, came to the United States in February 2007 
as the 24-year-old son of a U.S. citizen and a computer science student with a valid immigrant visa.  
However, upon arrival he was denied entry into the country; he was deemed inadmissible when 
customs agents at the San Francisco International Airport found “anti-American” material—
consisting of, inter alia al Jazeera news stories on his hard drive and a September 11 conspiracy 
theory series downloaded onto his hard drive—in his possession.  He has been in immigration 
detention ever since.   
 
The government never alleged that Abu Fayad had taken any actions toward terrorist or criminal 
activity.  But the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the government’s claim that Abu Fayad 
was deportable on the grounds that he is likely to engage in terrorist activity at some point in the 
future.  In making this claim, the government relied on the following rationales: an FBI ‘expert’ on 
radical Islam who pointed to the materials found on Abu Fayad’s computer; the fact that Abu 
Fayad’s childhood mosque was led by an imam who later became a famous Hamas politician; the 
fact that two of his cousins were members of Hamas; and the fact that he had been assigned 
roommates who were members of Hamas for a brief period in college.84  The so-called expert did 
not properly account for the tenuous nature of Abu Fayad’s relationships with Hamas members, or 
for the fact that Hamas is the political party governing Gaza, where Abu Fayad grew up.  The Court 
also pointed to the DHS expert’s conclusion that Abu Fayad’s computer science training, college-
education, clean criminal record, and green card would make him an “exceptionally attractive target 
for recruitment” by Hamas.85  As a result, Abu Fayad has been languishing in immigration detention 
for more than four years.  
 
 
Other lawyers report receiving denials under the terrorism bars provisions in response to 
applications for temporary visas, green cards, and naturalization.  
Case Study:  Tariq Ramadan 
 
Tariq Ramadan, a citizen of Switzerland and professor at Oxford University—a leading 
reformist Islamic scholar whose intellectual aims include bridging the so-called gulf between 
Western and Islamic values86—was prevented from taking up a professorship at Notre Dame in 
2004 when the State Department revoked his work visa based on an “ideological exclusion” 
provision under the terrorism bars.87  Ramadan was subsequently denied even visitor visas to come 
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to the United States on speaking engagements for being deemed inadmissible for “providing 
material support to a terrorist organization.”88  The factual grounds for the material support charge 
was that Ramadan donated 600 Euros (approximately $900) to two charitable organizations in 
France and Switzerland89 that were alleged to have ties to Hamas, even though Ramadan claims he 
had no knowledge of these alleged ties. 
 
In January 2006, the ACLU filed a suit on behalf of groups that had intended to invite Ramadan 
for meetings and speaking engagements on First Amendment grounds.  The case reached the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals which ruled that the First Amendment had been violated and that 
the government cannot exclude someone for material support without affording them the 
opportunity to present clear and convincing evidence that he did not know that the recipient of his 
contributions had been deemed a terrorist organization.90  In January 2010, Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton lifted Ramadan’s ban.91  Since then, he has traveled to the United States on multiple 
occasions for speaking engagements.92  
 
E.  FBI INFLUENCE ON IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS   
 
Lawyers report that the FBI has a strong influence on immigration officials’ actions regarding 
Muslim non-citizens.  They say that the FBI takes advantage of the lowered due process protections 
in the immigration system to more easily promote law enforcement goals.  Lawyers cite the presence 
of FBI agents during immigration proceedings, ICE’s reliance on statements made in old FBI 
interviews in its decisions, and the FBI’s submission of prejudicial affidavits raising national security 
concerns without providing the basis of the allegations.93  In addition, as with the Farahi case noted 
above, FBI agents have used the vulnerabilities associated with immigration processes to coerce 
Muslim immigrants into becoming informants or retaliate against them if they refuse.94  
Case Study:  Yassine Ouassif95 
 
Ouassif, a Moroccan national, received his green card in 2001.  In 2005, U.S. border agents 
stopped him when he attempted to enter the country from Canada.  They took away his green card 
and an FBI official told him he would get it back only if he agreed to become a government 
informant.  If he refused, he was told, the FBI agent would work to deport him back to Morocco.  
Ouassif refused. 
 
Two weeks later, Ouassif reported for an immigration interview to determine whether he would 
get his green card back.  The immigration officials interrogated him at length about a former 
roommate who had returned home to Baghdad, Iraq shortly after Ouassif moved in.  The 
immigration officials then told Ouassif that they intended to detain him prior to deportation and 
asked him whether he still wished to fight deportation.  He said yes. 
 
However, the DHS lawyer on duty refused to sign off on his detention, citing a lack of evidence.  
Three months later, DHS officials returned Ouassif’s green card 
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Case Study: Zuhair Mahd96 
 
Zuhair Mahd, a Jordanian national and blind adaptive technologies specialist, became a 
permanent U.S. resident in 1999.  In 2004, he applied for citizenship and successfully completed his 
interview, but USCIS did not schedule his oath ceremony.  In January 2005, while Mahd was waiting 
to hear the final decision on his naturalization application, the FBI visited him, interrogated him on 
his immigration status, background, work, home, friends, political views, and travels, and eventually 
asked him to become a “source of information.”  He refused.  After applying a great deal of 
pressure, the agents eventually relented and instructed Mahd not to tell anyone about the interview.   
 
A different set of FBI agents visited him in December 2005 and asked him to become an 
informant tracking suspicious Internet activities.  Once again, he refused.  During the interview, the 
agents posed several accusatory questions about an Internet domain name Mahd had registered for a 
company he co-founded that produced a screen reader in Arabic for the visually-impaired and about 
an interview posted on his website with Al-Jazeera about the screen reader.  The FBI approached 
him a third and final time in August 2006, and the agents offered to help him with his citizenship 
application for his cooperation.  By this time, Mahd had filed a suit to compel the government to 
process his application and he informed the agents of this.  He later returned to USCIS to check the 
status of his application and was told that his file had been lost.  On June 20, 2007, USCIS denied 
his naturalization application.  After five years and a pro se lawsuit, USCIS reversed its decision and in 
2009 Mahd was sworn in as a U.S. citizen.   
 
 
The patterns detailed in this Briefing Paper implicate a number of fundamental human rights 
guaranteed to citizens and non-citizens alike.  The following section identifies the nature and scope 
of U.S. obligations to afford these protections under international law.   
 
III.  INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS AND OBLIGATIONS 
 
The United States has ratified two of the key international instruments that confer rights 
guarantees upon non-citizens: the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD)97 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).98  Although international human rights law recognizes that States can make distinctions 
between citizens and non-citizens for the provision of certain rights,99 international law also 
guarantees a number of rights to non-citizens.100  As noted by the Human Rights Committee, the 
oversight body for ICCPR, “the general rule is that each one of the rights of [ICCPR] must be 
guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens” and all rights in the Covenant apply, 
even in cases of entry and residence if discrimination is involved.101  In addition, international law 
requires States to ensure equality between citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights to the extent recognized under international law.102  
ICERD specifically prohibits the United States from discriminating between non-citizens based on 
race or ethnic or national origin within the immigration system.103  
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A.  NON-DISCRIMINATION 
Non-discrimination is a non-derogable peremptory norm of international human rights law.104  
Non-discrimination features prominently in ICERD and ICCPR.  Although ICERD does not on its 
face cover discrimination based on religion,105 the ICCPR does.106  Moreover, ICERD has been 
interpreted to prohibit religious discrimination, especially when consistently tied to racial 
discrimination.107  Furthermore, the construction of a terrorist ‘other’ in the post-9/11 context has 
conflated notions of race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, gender, and political views, effectively 
racializing Islam, Muslims, and Muslim religious practice as radical and dangerous to U.S. national 
security interests.108 
 
To assess whether the U.S. government’s use of the immigration system against Muslims in the 
ways described above is illegal under international law, two key questions must be addressed. 
 
First, Do the government’s immigration policies have the purpose or effect of disproportionately burdening a 
particular racial, ethnic, religious, or national group?  International law prohibits both direct (discriminatory 
purpose) and indirect (disparate impact) discrimination.109 
 
Second, Is this disproportionate burden justified?  International law allows discrimination to be 
justified in certain circumstances, where the aim of the measure is legitimate and the differentiation 
is objective, reasonable, and proportional to that aim.110 
 
1. Do the government’s immigration policies have the purpose or effect of 
 disproportionately burdening a particular racial, religious, ethnic or 
 national group? 
 
The patterns identified in this Briefing Paper suggest that the government is targeting Muslim 
non-citizens for detention, deportation, and denials of temporary visas, green cards, and 
naturalization.  While there may be no statutory provisions explicitly targeting Muslims in the ways 
described above, the implementation of immigration law suggests a pattern of discrimination.  
Moreover, it is worth noting that the Third Agency Check procedure targets for extra detention 
based on whether someone is from a “special interest country” and media reports suggest these are 
Muslim majority countries.111  Government actions appear to be targeting Muslims when they are: 
subjected to multiple interviews to get conflicting statements to make false statement charges; 
targeted for deportation because of political activities;112 and considered national security threats 
based on factors such as where they grew up.113  The government has also previously targeted 
Muslim non-citizens in several large-scale immigration or immigration-related programs, such as 
NSEERS, that were widely viewed as discriminatory.114 
 
Even if these immigration policies do not have a discriminatory purpose, they nonetheless often 
result in a discriminatory effect.  The government has increasingly conflated immigration and 
counterterrorism laws since September 11, 2001, and has explicitly promulgated the notion that the 
immigration system should be used as a tool in the “War on Terror.”115  The lurking terrorism 
allegations, the charges based on links to Muslim charities, the detention of Muslim immigrants on 
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flimsy charges,116 and the influence of the FBI on immigration proceedings involving Muslims are 
the results of this conflation of immigration and counterterrorism policies.  Because 
counterterrorism efforts predominantly concentrate on Muslim communities,117 the merging of these 
two areas has resulted in aggressive, heightened scrutiny of Muslims by immigration authorities.118   
 2.  Is the disproportionate burden justified? 
 
Under international law, policies that discriminate against particular groups (either in purpose or 
effect) must be justified in order not to constitute prohibited discrimination.  Some of the factors 
that may be considered in determining whether a burden is justified include: 
 
 The importance of the right sought to be infringed by the measure;119 
 The aim or objective of the measure, including its legitimacy; 120 
 The nature of the differentiation (whether it uses criteria that are “objective and 
reasonable”); 121 and, 
 The proportionality between the effects of the means used and the ends or aim sought 
(including an assessment of whether the means effectively advance the end).122 
With regard to the importance of the right infringed by the measure, the prohibition on 
discrimination is a peremptory norm of international law and applies to all parts of a State’s 
immigration policy, including deportation proceedings and naturalization applications.123  Moreover, 
the other rights laid out in this Briefing Paper as being affected—such as the rights to due process 
and liberty and security of person—are at the very core of human rights protections. 
 
The U.S. government would argue that its use of the immigration system as a counterterrorism 
tool serves the legitimate purposes of national security.124  While national security in itself is a 
legitimate aim, the objective of removing Muslim individuals—who often have built careers, lives, 
and families in the United States—on the basis of racial and religious stereotypes does not comply 
with human rights norms.  The CERD Committee—the oversight body for ICERD—has stated 
that States must continue to comply with their nondiscrimination obligations in any actions 
undertaken in the context of the “War on Terror.”125  The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering 
Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, has also urged the U.S. government “not to act in a manner which 
might be seen as advocating the use of race and religion for the identification of persons as 
terrorists.”126 
 
The remaining criteria—whether the means used are proportional and reasonable—further 
suggest that the government’s immigration policies are not justified.  As for the effectiveness of the 
policies, the reliance on a racialized construct of religion to identify potential terrorists rests on the 
premise that Muslims are more likely to commit terrorist attacks.  This assumption has been 
invalidated on numerous occasions.127  Additionally, the targeting of individuals based on their 
religious background, rather than on actual violent or criminal activity, disrupts Muslim 
communities’ ability to exercise fundamental rights to religion, speech, and association.128  Thus, the 
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use of religious and racial profiling as a proxy for identifying and disabling potential terrorists is not 
an effective or proportional means to achieving the government’s national security purposes.   
 3.  The disproportionate burden on Muslim communities is illegal under 
 international law. 
 
The importance of the rights to be infringed by targeted immigration policies, combined with 
the lack of effectiveness and reasonableness, render such a disproportionate burden unjustified and 
illegal under international law. 
 
B.  OTHER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 
In addition to non-discrimination, the U.S. government’s targeting of Muslims through the 
immigration system implicates other fundamental rights under international law. 
1.  The right to due process 
 
Under international law, the United States must guarantee due process and equal treatment in 
tribunals, to citizens and non-citizens alike, including in immigration proceedings.129  The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has concluded that immigration detention and 
deportation proceedings require “as broad as possible” interpretation of due process requirements.130 
 
The ICCPR’s Article 13 also states that a non-citizen who is lawfully in a State can be “expelled 
therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where 
compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against 
his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by” competent authorities.131  The Human Rights 
Committee has interpreted the language of Article 13 as covering non-citizens who wish to challenge 
the legality of their status and further explained that such a non-citizen “must be given full facilities 
for pursuing his remedy against expulsion so that this right will in all the circumstances of his case 
be an effective one.”132  The IACHR has stated that detention review procedures should include 
“the defendant’s right to an impartial hearing in decisions that affect his or her fate, his or her right 
to present evidence and refute the State’s arguments, and the opportunity to be represented by 
counsel.”133  The United States is also obligated to ensure the principle of non-refoulement in its 
deportation policies, by not transferring anyone to a State where there is a substantial risk of 
torture.134 
 
The U.S. immigration system fails to provide due process to non-citizens.  Jorge Bustamante, the 
current U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, has stated that U.S. 
“deportation policies violate the right to fair deportation procedures, including cases in which the 
lawful presence of the migrant in question is in dispute.”135  Bustamante has highlighted the lack of 
adequate due process in detention appeals, saying that immigration enforcement authorities have 
“absolute discretion to determine whether a non-citizen may be released from detention” and since 
“these discretionary decisions are not subject to judicial review, current United States practice 
violates international law.”136  He has also stated that mandatory detention furthermore “severely 
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impairs the right of a respondent in removal proceedings to present evidence in her or his own 
defense.”137 
 
In addition to the failure to provide due process in its immigration system generally, the United 
States further exacerbates the due process violations for Muslims by introducing unsubstantiated 
and immaterial terrorism-related allegations during immigration hearings that may potentially 
prejudice the immigration judge; presenting evidence and calling in witnesses without disclosure or 
warning to the defendants; and using immigration consequences as coercive tools in criminal 
cases.138 
2.  The right to liberty and security of person 
 
Under the ICCPR, the United States must guarantee “the right to liberty and security of person,” 
which includes the prohibition of “arbitrary arrest or detention.”139  International law thus requires 
that “the decision to detain someone should be made on a case-by-case basis after an assessment of 
the functional need to detain a particular individual.”140 
 
The Human Rights Committee has stated that “the notion of ‘arbitrariness’ must not be equated 
with ‘against the law’ but be interpreted more broadly to include such elements as inappropriateness 
and injustice,” and that, “remand in custody could be considered arbitrary if it is not necessary in all 
the circumstances of the case.”141  In the immigration context, illegal entry by itself would not justify 
detention for any particular period of time.142  In fact, IACHR has concluded that for immigration 
detention, “the standard for the exceptionality of pre-trial detention must be even higher because 
immigration violations ought not to be construed as criminal offenses.”143  Gabriela Rodríguez 
Pizarro, the former Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, has stated that the 
“[d]etention of migrants on the ground of their irregular status should under no circumstances be of 
a punitive nature.”144 
 
The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention adds that,  
 
“detention should be the last resort and permissible only for the shortest period of time and that 
alternatives to detention should be sought whenever possible.  Grounds for detention must be 
clearly and exhaustively defined and the legality of detention must be open for challenge before a 
court and regular review within fixed times limits.”145  
 
When a State fails to provide such legal guarantees while detaining and deporting non-citizens, 
“their continued detention and subsequent expulsion are to be considered as arbitrary.”146 
 
In the context of assessing U.S. immigration detention policies as a whole, the current U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Migrants, Jorge A. Bustamante, has concluded that these 
policies violate international laws that bar arbitrary detention by: “Failing to promptly inform 
detainees of the charges against them; Failing to promptly bring detainees before a judicial authority; 
Denying broad categories of detainees release on bond without individualized assessments; 
Subjecting detainees to investigative detention without judicial oversight; [and] Denying detainees 
access to legal counsel.”147 
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Mandatory detention laws, in particular, present problems as “[u]nder United States law, migrant 
detainees about whom the United States has certain national security concerns are subject to the 
possibility of indefinite detention, in contravention of international standards.”148  Mandatory 
detention also “strips immigration judges of the authority to determine during a full and fair hearing 
whether or not an individual presents a danger or a flight risk.”149  While serving as the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants Workers, Gabriela Rodríguez Pizarro expressed 
concern that anti-terrorism legislation “allowing for the detention of migrants on the basis of vague, 
unspecified allegations of threats to national security” poses a threat to human rights.150  The 
terrorism bars provisions and the practice of pressing flimsy immigration charges to detain and 
deport Muslims outlined in this Briefing Paper are prime examples of such laws. 
3.  The right to freedom of religion 
 
Article 18 of the ICCPR mandates that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion,” and makes this a non-derogable right.151  The U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering 
Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, has recommended in light of his review of U.S. practices that States 
“not use the country of origin of a person as a proxy for racial or religious profiling” and has urged 
States “not to act in a manner which might be seen as advocating the use of race and religion for the 
identification of persons as terrorists.”152   
 
A larger set of discriminatory law enforcement and surveillance patterns against Muslims, 
coupled with the trends identified in this Briefing Paper—such as subjecting Muslims to multiple 
immigration process interviews to ask about their religious and social activities and charging 
Muslims with making false statements for failure to disclose donations or affiliations to Muslim 
charities—have a chilling effect on charitable giving and religious worship153 and thus collectively 
impinge on Muslims’ fundamental rights to freedom of religion.  
4.  The right to freedom of opinion and expression 
 
International law requires states to guarantee freedom of opinion and expression.154  The use of 
political opinions and activities as bases for immigration consequences illustrates how U.S. 
immigration policies contravene international law.  The Human Rights Committee has explicitly 
criticized terrorism bars provisions for their effects on freedom of opinion and expression, voicing 
concern over the “potentially overbroad reach of the definitions of terrorism under domestic law, in 
particular under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (3) (B) and Executive Order 13224 which seem to extend to 
conduct, e.g. in the context of political dissent, which, although unlawful, should not be understood 
as constituting terrorism.”155 
5.  The right to private life and family 
 
Under international law, the United States must uphold an individual’s rights to private life and 
family.156  The Human Rights Committee has explicitly stated that the right to family life imposes 
limits on States’ powers to deport non-citizens.157  The U.S. government’s punitive deportation 
procedures violate the right to private life and family unity: as the current U.N. Special Rapporteur 
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on the Human Rights of Migrants has concluded, “[b]ecause United States immigration laws impose 
mandatory deportation without a discretionary hearing where family and community ties can be 
considered, these laws fail to protect the right to private life, in violation of the applicable human 
rights standards.”158   
 
In sum, the practices highlighted in this Briefing Paper suggest that above and beyond the myriad 
problems all immigrants to the United States face in the immigration system, the U.S. government is 
targeting Muslim communities through its immigration system in particular ways that have serious 
human rights implications.  These policies and practices violate U.S. obligations to: uphold the right 
to non-discrimination; ensure equality between citizens and non-citizens in the provision of 
fundamental rights; and, to protect rights to due process, liberty, and security of person, religion, 
opinion, and expression, as well as family.   
 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
The United States should uphold its obligations under international human rights law to 
guarantee fundamental human rights for citizens and non-citizens alike.  CHRGJ and AALDEF urge 
the U.S. government to immediately take steps toward the following: 
 
 Ensure due process and fair trial rights, including right to counsel, in the immigration context by: 
o Disallowing the DHS or FBI from introducing unsubstantiated, unverified, and 
uncharged terrorism-related allegations into immigration proceedings;  
o Requiring DHS lawyers to reveal the basis of terrorism allegations raised in 
immigration proceedings; and,  
o Applying the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Federal Rules of Evidence, and 
constitutional guarantees available in criminal court to immigration court 
proceedings.159 
 
 End the discriminatory enforcement of immigration laws against Muslim communities and other affected 
communities—including the use of repeat interviews without legitimate purpose—by:  
o Precluding reliance on religious and political activities as admissible evidence to 
suggest an individual is a potential threat, or as reason to deny immigration benefits 
or relief; and, 
o Ending the “third agency check” process in as much as it delays an individual’s 
removal and release from detention solely on the basis of his nationality. 
 
 Scrutinize the FBI-DHS collusion in the immigration system, implement greater checks and balances, and 
provide more transparency about the role of the FBI in immigration enforcement by: 
o Disallowing the FBI from relying on vulnerable immigration status as a grounds on 
which to approach or request someone to become an informant; and,  
o Requiring FBI agents to make purpose of presence known during immigration 
interviews, allowing individuals to seek legal advice before proceeding. 
 
 Provide for greater transparency in decision-making in the immigration process so that immigrants know why 
they are being denied relief of any sort and on what basis.   
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Over the past several years, the U.S. human rights record has been reviewed annually as part of 
the U.N.’s intergovernmental Universal Periodic Review, as well as by the U.N. Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination.  Both processes have raised concerns about, inter alia, racial 
and religious profiling in counterterrorism policies, rising Islamophobia and xenophobia, and harsh 
immigration detention policies, echoing many of the concerns raised in this Briefing Paper.160   A 
number of U.N. Special Rapporteurs have also recently had occasion to review the U.S. 
government’s compliance with its human rights obligations.  CHRGJ and AALDEF urge the U.S. 
government to implement relevant recommendations arising out of these processes, including the 
following recommendations made by a range of U.N. Special Rapporteurs that the United States 
should:161 
 
 Eliminate mandatory detention and require the DHS to make individualized determinations 
of whether or not a non-citizen presents a danger to society or a flight risk sufficient to 
justify their detention;162 
 Clarify law enforcement’s obligation of equal treatment and the prohibition of racial 
profiling as well as pass the End Racial Profiling Act and comprehensive State legislation 
prohibiting racial profiling;163 
 Restrict definitions of “international terrorism,” “domestic terrorism,” and “material support 
to terrorist organizations” in a way that is precise and restricted to the type of conduct 
identified by the U.N. Security Council as conduct to be suppressed in the global fight 
against terrorism;164and,  
 Refrain from relying on a person’s country of origin as a proxy for racial or religious 
profiling and refrain from using race and religion as the bases for identifying individuals as 
terrorists.165 
 
Ten years after the events of September 11, 2011, xenophobia and Islamophobia continue to rise 
in the United States.  Both private and government actions have facilitated and contributed to what 
now appears to have become entrenched social bias with real legal consequences.  This Briefing 
Paper has documented a number of those consequences, in the form of cases suggesting patterns of 
the ongoing discriminatory use of the immigration system against Muslim communities in the 
United States.  In order to honor its human rights law obligations, the United States should take 
immediate steps to end the discriminatory targeting of Muslims through its immigration and law 
enforcement activities.   
                                                 
1 Targeting of Muslims through the immigration system was occurring prior to 9/11.  The INS was using secret evidence 
–undisclosed to defendants and, hence, virtually impossible to rebut–against Arabs and Muslims as early as the 1990s.  
Susan Akram and Kevin Johnson’s research found not a “single secret evidence case not involving an Arab or Muslim 
noncitizen.” Susan M. Akram and Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law after September 11, 2001: The 
Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. LAW 295, 322 (2002).  
2 Also known as “special registration,” on April 27, 2011, the DHS announced an indefinite suspension of the program, 
“though there remains much damage to rectify from NSEERS’ discriminatory immigration enforcement.”  Press 
Release, American Civil Liberties Union [hereinafter ACLU], DHS Announces Indefinite Suspension of Controversial 
and Ineffective Immigrant Registration and Tracking System (Apr. 27, 2011) available at 
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/dhs-announces-indefinite-suspension-controversial-and-ineffective-immigrant-
regist.  See, e.g., SHOBA WAHEEDA, CENTER FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS – DICKINSON LAW SCHOOL (PENNSYLVANIA 
STATE UNIVERSITY), NSEERS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S EFFORTS TO SECURE ITS BORDERS (2009), available 
at http://www.adc.org/PDF/nseerspaper.pdf; RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, FACES OF RACIAL PROFILING: A REPORT 
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FROM COMMUNITIES ACROSS AMERICA 29-31 (2010) (discussing NSEERS and Operation Front Line).  See also infra 
notes 20, 21 (discussing the specifics of the NSEERS program and Operation Front Line, respectively). 
3 CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, AMERICANS ON HOLD: PROFILING, 
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later in the Paper.   
6 Press Release, ACLU, supra note 2.  There continue to be concerns about the ongoing ramifications of NSEERS.  See, 
e.g., Press Release, Desis Rising Up and Moving, DRUM Welcomes Victory in Ending NSEERS and Calls for 
Accountability for Thousands of Muslim Families Already Torn Apart (Apr. 28, 2011).   
7 See infra Part II.D. 
8 See infra Part II.E. 
9 See infra note 38. 
10 See Marisa Taylor, Law Enforcement Officials Secretly Profiling Immigrants, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, March 4, 2008, 
available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/v-print/story/29282.html.  
11 In October 2001, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft stated, “Let the terrorists among us be warned: If you 
overstay your visa—even by one day—we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you will be put in jail and kept in 
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See Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 438 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing NAT’L COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE 
U.S., SEPTEMBER 11TH COMMISSION REPORT 384 (2004): “The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 were facilitated 
by the lax enforcement of immigration laws.”). See generally David A. Martin, Refining Immigration Law’s Role in 
Counterterrorism, A Working Paper of the Series on Counterterrorism and American Statutory Law (Brookings Inst., Georgetown 
Univ. Law Ctr. & Hoover Inst. Working Paper Series, Jan. 2009), available at 
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David D. Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002). 
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by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
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Counsel for his defense [sic].”); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury 
requires a jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt). 
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the case of “egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment or other liberties” or “widespread” violations of those 
liberties by immigration agents); Stella Burch Elias, Good Reason to Believe: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of 
Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109 (2008) (arguing that the 
“widespread violation” standard in Lopez-Mendoza has been met, requiring the reinstatement of the exclusionary rule in 
immigration proceedings). 
 
Under the Radar: Muslims Deported, Detained, and Denied on Unsubstantiated Terrorism Allegations 
 
    
 
23 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 As David Cole has stated, “It is often said that civil liberties are the first casualty of war. It would be more accurate to 
say that noncitizens’ liberties are the first to go. The current war on terrorism is no exception.” Cole, supra note 7, at 955. 
18 See id. at 957. See, e.g., AMERICANS ON HOLD 2007, supra note 3; Americans on Hold 2010, supra note 4. 
19 Initiated in January 2002, the Absconder Apprehension Initiative was a program aimed at arresting non-citizens from 
predominantly Muslim countries who had outstanding deportation orders.  See Dan Eggen, Deportee Sweep Will Start With 
Mideast Focus, WASH. POST., Feb. 8, 2002, at A01; Susan Sachs, U.S. Begins Crackdown On Muslims Who Defy Orders to Leave 
Country, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/02/nyregion/nation-challenged-
deportations-us-begins-crackdown-muslims-who-defy-orders-leave.html.  
20 The call-in registration phase of NSEERS required almost all noncitizen men between the ages of 16 to 45 from 25 
countries (all Muslim-majority except North Korea) to submit to fingerprinting, photographs, intensive questioning, and 
periodic registration with the government. Of the 83,519 men who registered with authorities under this program, 
13,799 were placed in removal proceedings.  Although the government discontinued the call-in program in December 
2003, individuals who failed to register with the program are still subject to grounds of deportability and inadmissibility. 
See WAHIDA, supra note 2, at 10.  
21 Established in the spring of 2004, one of the primary purposes of Operation Frontline was to prevent a terrorist attack 
around the November 2004 presidential elections.  As part of Operation Frontline, ICE claimed it was targeting 
immigration violators whom the government had identified posed national security concerns.  Under the program, 
thousands of non-citizens were investigated and hundreds arrested, primarily on minor visa violations.  Even though the 
government has denied explicitly targeting individuals based on ethnicity or religion, more than 80 percent of the 
individuals investigated under the program were from Muslim-majority countries. See Eric Lichtblau, Inquiry Targeted 
2,000 Foreign Muslims in 2004, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2008, at A17. 
22 See AMERICANS ON HOLD 2007, supra note 2; Americans on Hold 2010, supra note 3; CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, IRREVERSIBLE CONSEQUENCES: RACIAL PROFILING AND LETHAL 
FORCE IN THE “WAR ON TERROR” 19 (2006), available at 
http://www.chrgj.org/docs/CHRGJ%20Irreversible%20Consequences%20June%202006.pdf [hereinafter, 
IRREVERSIBLE CONSEQUENCES]; ASIAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, SPECIAL REGISTRATION: 
DISCRIMINATION AND XENOPHOBIA AS GOVERNMENT POLICY (2004), available at www.aaldef.org/docs/AALDEF-
Special-Registration-2004.pdf (detailing AALDEF’s survey findings of 219 individuals who were affected by the 
NSEERS Special Registration program).  
23 The case studies featured in this Briefing Paper, and the instances of troubling enforcement against Muslims that we 
learned about in our fact-finding, consist primarily of Muslim men.    
24 On April 27, 2011, the Department of Homeland Security announced an indefinite suspension of the program, 
“though there remains much damage to rectify from NSEERS’ discriminatory immigration enforcement.”  Press 
Release, American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 2.  
25  In February 2011, CHRGJ and AALDEF sent Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the DOJ’s Executive 
Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) and ICE in order to obtain additional government data to further understand the 
extent of the patterns of government practices targeting Muslims through the immigration system, as outlined in this 
briefing paper.  The FOIA requests asked for, inter alia, data to confirm the number of individuals charged under the 
various terrorism bar provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); written transcripts and audio tapes of 
oral proceedings; and written briefs submitted by all parties, from removal proceedings before Immigration Judges in 
which individuals were charged under the terrorism bar provisions.  To date, CHRGJ and AALDEF have not received 
adequate responses from the EOIR and ICE. 
26 Telephone Interview with Sin Yen Ling, Staff Attorney at Asian Law Caucus (Feb. 11, 2011) (notes on file with 
CHRGJ). 
27 Id.; Telephone Interview with Cecillia Wang, Managing Attorney at ACLU-San Francisco (Feb. 10, 2011) (notes on file 
with CHRGJ); Telephone Interview with Valerie Curtis-Diop, Owner at A.D.I.L.A. Law Group (Apr. 4, 2011) (notes on 
file with CHRGJ). 
28 Ling, supra note 26; Wang, supra note 27. 
29 Mary Beth Sheridan, Immigration Law as Anti-Terrorism Tool, WASH. POST, Jun. 13, 2005, at A1.   
30 Ling, supra note 26. 
31 Information contained in this case study is drawn from the following sources: Farahi v. United States, No. 07-cv-
23116) 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52974 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Trevor Aaronson, FBI Tries to Deport Muslim Man for Refusing to Be 
an Informant, MIAMI NEW TIMES, Oct. 8, 2009, available at http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2009-10-08/news/unholy-
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REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS (2003).  In addition, the NSEERS program resulted in the detention 
of many individuals for minor immigration violations. See Waheeda, supra note 2.  
46 See also STEPHEN DOWNS, PROJECT SALAM, VICTIMS OF AMERICA’S DIRTY WARS 48 (2011). 
47 Sheridan, supra note 29. 
48 Id.  
49 Many false statement allegations are based on prior associations with the Holy Land Foundation (HLF), which used to 
be the largest Muslim charity in the United States.  After the 2007 trial of the group’s founders, individuals who had any 
contact, however minimal, with the organization were investigated by immigration officials and eventually charged with 
not revealing this earlier association.  Telephone Interview with Linda Moreno, Attorney at the Law Office of Linda 
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Moreno (February 21, 2011) (notes on file with CHRGJ).  Mohamad Masfaka, described above, provides one example of 
such a case. 
50 See, e.g, INA § 316 (stating the “good moral character” requirement for naturalization).  
51 Telephone Interview with Jennie Pasquarella, Staff Attorney at ACLU-Southern California (Feb. 24, 2011) (notes on 
file with CHRGJ). 
52 When an immigration official believes an individual is providing false testimony, he must 1) ensure the individual 
understands the particular question asked and “ask enough questions, in different forms, to give the applicant ample 
opportunity to understand the intent and scope of the particular question”; 2) confront the applicant about the false 
statement and attempt to determine whether it was made because s/he believed the truth would negatively affect the 
application; and 3) take a statement of the applicant’s claimed motivation for the false testimony, and, if the statement 
does credibly establish an innocent motive for the false testimony, approve the application.  USCIS, ADJUDICATOR’S 
FIELD MANUAL, ch. 74 (2011), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.f6da51a2342135be7e9d7a10e0dc91a0/?vgnextoid=fa7e539dc4bed01
0VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&CH=afm  
53 See ACLU, supra note 44. 
54 Id. at 7-8, 61-63.  
55 SHIRIN SINNAR, LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, THE OFAC LIST, HOW A TREASURY DEPARTMENT 
TERRORIST WATCHLIST ENSNARES EVERYDAY CONSUMERS (2007).  
56 Information contained in this case study is drawn from the following sources: Pasquarella, supra note 51; Petition for 
De Novo Review of Denial of Application for Naturalization and Request for a Hearing Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), 
No. 10-cv-00894, Hamdi v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (C.D. Ca. No. June 16, 2010); USCIS Decision on 
Application of Tarek Hamdi, June 8, 2009 (on file with CHRGJ); USCIS Decision on Hearing of Tarek Hamdi, April 8, 
2010 (on file with CHRGJ).  See also Press Release, ACLU, Muslim Denied Citizenship because of Discriminatory 
Practices in Naturalization Process: Civil Rights Groups File FOIA to Uncover Racial and Religious Profiling, June 16, 
2010.  
57 As with the Holy Land Foundation, serious concerns have been expressed about the way in which the U.S. 
government designated Benevolence Financial International.  “In designating [BIF] . . . [the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control] relied on newspaper articles and other evidence that would not be admissible in a judicial proceeding.” ACLU, 
supra note 44, at 47; Matthew J. Piers, Malevolent Destruction of a Muslim Charity: A Commentary on the Prosecution of Benevolence 
International Foundation, 25 PACE L. REV. 339 (2005).  The ACLU report stated that 9/11 Commission staff noted with 
regard to BIF that “Although the OFAC action shut down BIF ...  that victory came at considerable cost of negative 
public opinion in the Muslim and Arab communities, who contend that the government’s destruction of these charities 
reflects bias and injustice with no measurable gain to national security.” ACLU, supra note 44, at 119 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  
58 ACLU Press Release, supra note56.  
59 If the government’s argument were true, then, theoretically, all immigrants would have to list every organization they 
donated to in their immigration applications.  This is an overly burdensome request that has no basis in immigration law 
or regulations.  
60 Initials used to protect identity.  Information contained in this case study is drawn from the following sources: 
Pasquarella, supra note 51; USCIS Decision on Application of BB, May 26, 2010 (on file with CHRGJ). 
61 Such inordinate delays in naturalization applications are the result of name check procedures that have discriminatory 
impacts on Muslim immigrants. See generally AMERICANS ON HOLD 2007, supra note 3.  
62 This past year, former Attorney General Michael Mukasey, former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, former 
Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, and former national security advisor Frances Townsend 
attended and spoke at a conference in support of the MEK in Paris, sparking a controversy about the group’s 
designation and whether the trip constituted criminal material support.  See, e.g., David Cole, Chewing Gum for Terrorists, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/opinion/03cole.html?_r=1; Brian 
Montopoli, Rudy Giuliani Denies Supporting Terrorist Organization, CBS NEWS, Jan. 10, 2011, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20028081-503544.html.  
63 USCIS Decision on Application of BB, May 26, 2010 (on file with CHRGJ) 
64 Information contained in this case study is drawn from the following sources: Jailed Houston Imam Zoubir Bouchikhi 
Speaks from Private Immigration Prison, DEMOCRACY NOW!, Apr. 29, 2009, 
http://www.democracynow.org/2009/4/29/exclusive_jailed_houston_imam_zoubir_bouchikhi; Paula Beltrán, Imam 
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Zoubir Bouchikhi: Arrested Shortly Before Deportation, HOUSTON PRESS, Jan 13, 2011, available at 
http://blogs.houstonpress.com/hairballs/2011/01/zoubir_bouchiki_imam.php.  
65 Bouchikhi v. Holder, No. 10-60982 (5th Cir.).  
66 Initials used to protect identity. Curtis-Diop, supra note 27. 
67 Sheridan, supra note 29. 
68 For examples of similar cases, see Tina Kelly & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Revered New Jersey Imam, Facing Deportation, Has 
Interfaith Support, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/24/nyregion/24imam.html; 
Paul Vitello & Kirk Semple, Muslims Say F.B.I. Tactics Sow Anger and Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/18/us/18muslims.html (discussing Tareq Saleh’s permanent residency denial based 
on false statements). 
69 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 561 U.S. __ (2010) (upholding the constitutionality of the §2339B material 
support provision of the PATRIOT Act).  
70 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, DENIAL AND DELAY:  THE IMPACT OF THE IMMIGRATION LAW’S “TERRORISM BARS” 
ON ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES (2009). 
71 A notable case in the asylum context in which terrorism bars provisions have been used in a discriminatory way 
against a Muslim is that of Ismoil Samadov.  See Yusupov, Samadov v. Attorney General, No. 09-3074. (3d. Cir., now 
pending)  Samadov, an Uzbek citizen, has been detained by ICE since 2004 based on an extradition warrant from the 
Uzbek government.  The U.S. has acknowledged that Samadov faces religious persecution and torture upon return to 
Uzbekistan but the Immigration Judge and BIA denied asylum and withholding of removal, claiming Samadov poses an 
“an actual danger to national security.”  The government has not provided any evidence that Samadov himself has any 
ties to terrorist activity.  The evidence presented by the U.S. government claiming Samadov “is a threat to the national 
security of the United States” includes facts about his housemates, for example that one had viewed certain videos and 
that another had received an email containing the word “jihad” in it.  Alongside other amici, AALDEF filed an amicus 
brief on behalf of Samadov, highlighting how the Immigration Judge and BIA’s rulings were based on “stereotypical 
inferences and assumptions that Muslims in the [U.S.] are insular and inherently dangerous.” Asian American Legal 
Defense and Education Fund, Litigation Docket, http://aaldef.org/litigation-docket/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2011).  
72  See David Cole and James X. Dempsey, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE 
NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 41-52 (2002); David Cole, 9/11 and the LA 8, THE NATION, Oct. 23, 2003, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/archive/911-and-la-8; The Case of LA8: U.S. Drops Twenty-Year Effort to Deport Arab Americans 
for Supporting Palestinian Rights, DEMOCRACY NOW!, Nov. 2, 2007, available at 
http://www.democracynow.org/2007/11/2/the_case_of_the_la8_u; Press Release, Center for Constitutional Rights, 
Judge Throws Out Charges in ‘Los Angeles Eight’ Case, available at http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-
releases/judge-throws-out-charges-%E2%80%9Clos-angeles-eight%E2%80%9D-case.   
73 The McCarran-Walter Act prohibited membership in communist groups. 
74 Muna Coobtee, U.S. Government Tries to Deport Palestinian Activists, PSLWEB, Jun. 1, 2005, available at 
http://www2.pslweb.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=11076&news_iv_ctrl=-1.  
75 The anti-communism provisions of the McCarran-Walter Act were declared as unconstitutional infringement of free 
speech.  American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal 1989), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1991).  The Ninth Circuit ruling 
came in 1991 after Congress already repealed the McCarran-Walter Act in 1990.  See also R. Jeffrey Smith, Patriot Act Used 
in 16-Year-Old Deportation Case, WASH. POST, Sep. 23, 2003, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn/A49517-2003Sep22?language=printer. 
76 Press Release, ACLU, California Judge Ends 20-Year-Old Deportation Case Against Palestinians, Jan. 30, 2007, 
available at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/california-judge-ends-20-year-old-deportation-case-against-
palestinians (last visited May 3, 2011). 
77 Telephone Interview with Charles Kuck, Immigration Attorney (Feb. 25, 2011) (notes on file with CHRGJ). 
78 Mohamed’s indictment also included material support to terrorism and weapons charges.  Elaine Silvestrini, Indictment 
Revises Charges Against Mohamed Megahed, TAMPA TRIB., Apr, 17, 2008, available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-
news/2003122/posts.  
79 Rich Phillips, Cleared by a Jury, Man is Labeled a Terrorist, CNN, Jun. 29, 2009, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/06/29/florida.terror.redo/.  
80 Elaine Silvestrini, Megahed Freed After Judge Tosses Deportation Case, TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 21, 2009, available at 
http://www2.tbo.com/content/2009/aug/21/211832/judge-tosses-deportation-case-against-megahed/news-metro/.  
In another case, a Haitian U.S. permanent resident Lyglenson Lemorin was charged under terrorism bars for removal 
after being acquitted in a criminal terrorism-related case.  Lemorin was a part of the so-called “Liberty City Seven” that 
the government alleged were a part of Al-Qaeda and plotted to blow up the Sears Tower in Chicago.  The case involved 
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informants and heavy government orchestration.  The immigration judge presiding over Lemorin’s case (the same judge 
who cleared Youssef Megahed) found Lemorin removable primarily for a taped oath pledging allegiance to Al-Qaeda 
that the government informant goaded Lemorin to make.  Kuck, supra note77. 
81 Youssef Megahed Freed After Immigration Judge Throws Out Government’s Deportation Case, DEMOCRACY NOW!, Aug. 29, 2009, 
available at http://www.democracynow.org/2009/8/24/youssef_megahed_freed_after_immigration_judge. 
82 Phillips, supra note 79.  
83 Information contained in this case study is drawn from the following sources: Tareq I.J. Abu Fayad v. Eric Holder, 
632 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2011); Telephone Interview with Love Suh (Feb. 28, 2011) (notes on file with CHRGJ); Bob 
Egelko, Man with Hamas Items on Computer can be Deported, S.F. GATE, Feb. 17, 2011, available at 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/02/16/BANB1HO1BJ.DTL.   
84 Abu Fayad, 632 F.3d at 631. 
85 Id. at 630.  
86 In 2009, Foreign Policy magazine ranked him as 49th among the world’s top 100 contemporary intellectuals. The FP Top 
100Global Thinkers, FOREIGN POLICY, December 2009, available at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/30/the_fp_top_100_global_thinkers?page=full.  Ironically, he has 
been criticized for his conciliatory approach and has been banned from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria 
for his criticisms of those regimes’ human rights violations. Tariq Ramadan, Tariq Ramadan Answers His Dutch Detractors, 
NRC HANDELSBLAD, Aug. 18, 2009, available at http://www.nrc.nl/international/opinion/article2331989.ece.   
87 The ideological exclusion provision allows the government to ban from entry individuals it believes “endorse[d] or 
espouse[d] terrorist activity.” INA §212(a)(3)(B)(ii)(i)(VII). 
88 Josh Gerstein, Oxford Scholar Denied Visa Duet to Alleged Hamas Links, N.Y. SUN, Sep. 26, 2006, available at 
http://www.nysun.com/national/oxford-scholar-denied-visa-due-to-alleged-hamas/40328/.  
89 Comité de Bienfaisance et Secours aux Palestiniens and the Association de Secours Palestinien are considered 
legitimate charities in Europe but were designated as “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” organizations by the U.S. 
Treasury in 2003.  Ramadan made his contributions to the charities between 1998 and 2002, before the Treasury’s 
designation.  Tariq Ramadan, Why I’m Banned in the USA, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2006, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/29/AR2006092901334.html.  
90 Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115 (2d. Cir. 2009); ACLU, Federal Appeals Court Rules in Favor of 
U.S. Organizations That Challenged Exclusion of Prominent Muslim Scholar, July 17, 2009, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/federal-appeals-court-rules-favor-us-organizations-challenged-exclusion-
prominent-  
91 Kirk Semple, At Last Allowed, Muslim Scholar Visits, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/nyregion/08muslim.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=tariq%20ramadan&st=cse.  
92 His first appearance in the United States after the government lifted the six-year ban on his entry was at Cooper Union 
in New York City.  See George Packer, An Evening with Tariq Ramadan, THE NEW YORKER: INTERESTING TIMES BLOG, 
April 9, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2010/04/an-evening-with-ramadan.html (last 
visited Apr. 27, 2011).  
93 Telephone Interview with Mike German, ACLU Policy Counsel on National Security (Mar. 9, 2011) (notes on file with 
CHRGJ); Ling, supra note 20. 
94 This trend is also seen in the case of Foad Farahi, described in Part II.A.  In another example, officials offered to drop 
immigration charges against Waheeda Tahseen, a Pakistani EPA official, if she became an informant.  She was deported 
after refusing.  Sheridan, supra note 29.  Tareq Saleh, whose case is described supra note 68, claims his green card 
application was denied after he refused FBI requests to become an informant.  See generally Downs, supra note 46, at 47-
50 (documenting the FBI’s pressuring of non-citizen Muslim individuals to become informants and the denial of 
immigration benefits and deportation upon refusal); Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) California, The 
FBI’s Use of Informants, Recruitment and Intimidation within Muslim Communities, available at 
ca.cair.com/download.php?f=/downloads/CAIR_FBI_Abuses_Annotated_Source_List--Articles_and_Cases.pdf (last 
visited April 27, 2011).  
95 Information contained in this case study is drawn from the following source: Peter Waldman, A Muslim’s Choice:  Turn 
U.S. Informant or Risk Losing Visa, WALL ST. J., Jul. 11, 2006, at A1. 
96 Americans on Hold 2010, supra note 4; Email from Zuhair Mahd to Amna Akbar (Apr. 27, 2011) (on file with 
CHRGJ); Telephone Interview with Zuhair Mahd (April 29, 2011) (notes on file with CHRGJ); Affidavit of Zuhair 
Mahd with respect to prior FBI visits, Civil Action No. 1:06-CV-01023-wdm-pac (D.Co. Aug. 25, 2006). 
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97 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), 
Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm [hereinafter ICERD]; United Nations Treaty Collection, 
Status of International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Apr. 
28, 2011).  
98 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), UN GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. 
No. 16, at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm [hereinafter ICCPR]; United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Apr. 
28, 2011).  
99 “This Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this 
Convention between citizens and non-citizens.” Art. 1(2), ICERD; “Exceptionally, some of the rights recognized in the 
Covenant are expressly applicable only to citizens (art. 25), while article 13 applies only to aliens. However, the 
Committee’s experience in examining reports shows that in a number of countries other rights that aliens should enjoy 
under the Covenant are denied to them or are subject to limitations that cannot always be justified under the Covenant.” 
UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 15: The Position of Aliens under the Covenant (Twenty-Seventh session, 
1986), ¶2 [hereinafter HRC General Comment 15] reprinted in COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL 
RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 140 (2003), 
available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/bc561aa81bc5d86ec12563ed004aaa1b?Opendocument; “It is in 
principle a matter for the State to decide who it will admit to its territory.”Id., ¶3. 
100 As noted by the Human Rights Committee, “[E]ach State party must ensure the rights in the Covenant to ‘all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’ (art. 2, para. 1). In general, the rights set forth in the 
Covenant apply to everyone, irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of his or her nationality or statelessness.” Id. ¶ 1.  
Furthermore, the Committee noted that “[a]liens thus have an inherent right to life, protected by law, and may not be 
arbitrarily deprived of life… They have the right to liberty of movement and free choice of residence; they shall be free 
to leave the country… They may not be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy, family, home 
or correspondence… Aliens receive the benefit of the right of peaceful assembly and of freedom of association… Aliens 
are entitled to equal protection by the law. There shall be no discrimination between aliens and citizens in the application 
of these rights.  These rights of aliens may be qualified only by such limitations as may be lawfully imposed under the 
Covenant.”  Id. ¶ 7.  ICCPR does allow States to treat citizens and non-citizens differently with respect to political rights 
(e.g. right to vote) and freedom of movement (for unlawful aliens); however, the rights concerned in this paper apply to 
non-citizens equally. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RIGHTS OF 
NON-CITIZENS (2006), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/noncitizensen.pdf. 
101 HRC General Comment 15, supra note 99, ¶3. 
102 The CERD Committee, the oversight body for ICERD, has made clear that even though ICERD permits States to 
differentiate between citizens and non-citizens, they must still “avoid undermining the basic prohibition on 
discrimination.” U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 30: 
Discrimination Against Non Citizens, ¶¶ 1-3, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (Oct. 1, 2004) [hereinafter CERD 
General Recommendation 30].  In other words, States should not detract in any way from the rights and freedoms 
recognized in particular in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [hereinafter UDHR], the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the ICCPR.  Id. ¶2.  The CERD Committee has also noted that 
“differential treatment based on citizenship or immigration status will constitute discrimination if the criteria for such 
differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to a 
legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim.”  Id. ¶¶ 2, 4.   
103 Id. ¶ 25 (states must “[e]nsure that laws concerning deportation or other forms of removal of non-citizens from the 
jurisdiction of the State party do not discriminate in purpose or effect among non-citizens on the basis of race, color or 
ethnic or national origin”); id at ¶ 13 (requiring states to “[e]nsure that particular groups of non-citizens are not 
discriminated against with regard to access to citizenship or naturalization”). 
104 U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Statement on Racial Discrimination and Measures to Combat 
Terrorism, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/23/Add. 1 (Nov. 1, 2002) [hereinafter CERD Committee Statement on 
Racial Discrimination] (recalling that “the prohibition on racial discrimination is a peremptory norm of international law 
from which no derogation is permitted”).  See also, Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory 
Opinion, OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 18, ¶101 (Sep. 17, 2003) (“This Court considers that the principle 
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of equality before the law, equal protection before the law and non-discrimination belongs to jus cogens, because the 
whole legal structure of national and international public order rests on it and it is a fundamental principle that 
permeates all laws.”)  
105 ICERD defines prohibited “racial discrimination” to include “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 
based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.”  Art. 1(1) ICERD.   
106 Arts. 2 and 26 ICCPR. “[T]he term ‘discrimination’ as used in the Covenant should be understood to imply any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” U.N. Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment 18: Non-discrimination (Thirty-Seventh session, 1989), ¶7 [hereinafter HRC General Comment 18]. 
107 “The Committee notes that the State party recognizes the “intersectionality” of racial and religious discrimination, as 
illustrated by the prohibition of discrimination on ethnic grounds against such communities as Jews and Sikhs, and 
recommends that religious discrimination against other immigrant religious minorities be likewise prohibited.” UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination: The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/63/CO/11 (Dec. 10, 
2003). “[A]lthough religion was not included in the Convention as one of the grounds on which racial discrimination was 
prohibited… The Committee itself sometimes had to take into account religious aspects when they appeared to be part 
of a consistent trend of discrimination against some people.”  U.N. HR Comm., Implementation of the Programme of Action 
for the Third Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/68/Add.1 (Dec. 5, 1996).   
108 IRREVERSIBLE CONSEQUENCES, supra note 22, at 19. (citing Margaret Chon & Donna E. Arzt, Walking While Muslim, 
68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 221–22 (2005)).  See also RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, FACES OF RACIAL PROFILING: A 
REPORT FROM COMMUNITIES ACROSS AMERICA 24-34 (2010) (“Following the tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, members 
of Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim and South Asian communities became automatically suspect as the government, in the 
name of national security, implemented programs and policies that profiled individuals of these communities based on 
their perceived race, ethnicity, religion or national origin. Members of these communities were increasingly and 
disproportionately placed under surveillance, stopped, searched, interrogated, detained and labeled ‘terrorism suspects.’ 
The government also began aggressively using civil immigration laws, criminal laws and criminal procedure in a sweeping 
and discriminatory manner to target members of these communities.”); Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-
September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1259 (2004) (“The physical violence exercised upon 
the bodies of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians has been accompanied by a legal and political violence toward these 
communities. . . .  Taken together, the multiple assaults on the bodies and rights of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians 
produce a psychological violence as well and reracialize the communities they target as ‘Muslim-looking’ foreigners 
unworthy of membership in the national polity.”); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002); 
Murad Hussain, Defending the Faithful: Speaking the Language of Group Harm in Free Exercise Challenges to Counterterrorism 
Profiling, 117 YALE L.J. 920, 926 (2008); FAIZA PATEL, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, RETHINKING RADICALIZATION 
(2011), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/rethinking_radicalization/.  
109 IRREVERSIBLE CONSEQUENCES, supra note 22, at 21. U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
General Recommendation No. 14: Definition of Racial Discrimination, ¶ 2 (Forty-second session, 1993), U.N. Doc A/48/18 at 
114 (1994) [hereinafter CERD General Recommendation 14].  HRC General Comment 18, supra note 106, ¶ 7. 
110 Art. 1(3) ICERD; “Under the Convention, differential treatment based on citizenship or immigration status will 
constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the 
Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim.” 
CERD Committee General Recommendation 30, supra note 102, ¶ 4. See also CERD General Recommendation 14, supra note 109, ¶ 
2; U. N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 20: Non-discriminatory 
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